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Toni M. Massaro* 
GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET. By 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1999. 
Pp. ix, 470. $45. 
The last few decades have seen a torrent of legal commentary sup­
porting gay equality and attacking the punishment, failure to protect, 
and refusal to affirm gay conduct and identity. William Eskridge,1 a 
prominent voice in this fin-de-siecle literature, now draws together 
and expands on his previous work2 in Gaylaw: Challenging the 
Apartheid of the Closet. Though far more successful in shaping the 
uses of the past than in showing the way to the future, the book in­
structs even where it fails. It augurs a century that could well witness 
the end of official discrimination against gay individuals, and the re­
legation of "gaylaw" to American legal history. 
Eskridge builds his chapters around three discrete definitions of 
gay law: 
• "Gaylaw is the ongoing history of state rules relating to gender and 
sexual non-conformity" (p. 1). 
• "Gaylaw is, also, reconceiving law from a more gay-friendly or gay­
neutral perspective" (p. 2; emphasis added). 
* Dean and Milton 0. Riepe Chair in Constitutional Law, The University of Arizona, 
James E. Rogers College of Law. B.S. !CJ77, Northwestern; J.D. 1980, William & Mary . -
Ed. Many thanks to Barbara Allen Babcock, Bernard Harcourt, Genevieve Leavitt, and 
Catherine O'Neill for invaluable critiques of this Review. Thanks also to Adam Michael 
Becker and his colleagues on the Michigan Law Review for a smooth and professional edito­
rial process. 
1. Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
2. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND 
THE LAW (1997); WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM 
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996) [hereinafter EsKRIDGE, CASE FOR 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: 
Establishing Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-1981, 
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817 (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gay/egal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 607 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, 
Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE 
LJ. 2411 (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of the 
Closet, 1946-1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703 (1997). 
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• "Gaylaw is, finally, derived from insights of the gay experience in 
America and its theoretical sibling 'queer theory'" (p. 2; emphasis 
added). 
Under the first two definitions, he offers an excellent synthesis of the 
historical backdrop to modern laws and a cogent analysis of legal doc­
trine that addresses antigay policies. He makes a convincing case 
against these policies as well, given their frequently unpredictable, un­
toward consequences. Leaving behind the historical and pragmatic 
arguments, however, Eskridge plunges into a theoretical thicket in 
forging his third definition of gaylaw. He makes internally contradic­
tory appeals to liberalism and to various postliberal models that un­
dermine his doctrinal arguments, many of which depend heavily on 
liberal premises. 
That the book works so well in its historical and doctrinal seg­
ments, but is less convincing in its final, theoretically thick segment, 
may suggest a technique for future gay equality appeals. Legal advo­
cates might do well to underscore, as Eskridge does repeatedly and 
persuasively, how prohibitions of private, consensual sexual behavior 
often produce paradoxical, counterproductive results. Government 
regulation of private sexual behavior typically proves to be wasteful, 
senseless, and destructive, no matter what outcome one prefers re­
garding the behavior. Techniques that stress this practical insight may 
yield far more progress in overturning antigay regulations than would 
techniques that rely heavily on ornate political or legal theories about 
government power to regulate sexual behavior. There is much to sup­
port such a case against antigay laws in Eskridge's well-documented 
and well-wrought historical exposition. 
I. 
Eskridge's opening segment canvasses a full century of legal treat­
ment of sexual nonconformity in the United States. This engaging, 
concise survey addresses government's historically variable attempts 
to regulate sexual conduct and identity in multiple settings, including 
the military, the family, social clubs and bars, and the streets. In each 
venue, American law in the 1900s sought to suppress homosexuality 
and gender transgression, with uneven, sometimes brutal, often inef­
fective and paradoxical results. Over the century's course, law's con­
structions of sexual deviance, and of the social perils of gender trans­
gression, varied significantly. 
Pre-1900, the law sought to police the "[w]omen and men who 
transgressed increasingly hardened gender lines" by arresting indi­
viduals whose public presentations disrupted conventional gender 
rules (p. 13). After World War I, however, the legal focus shifted 
away from this aesthetic preoccupation with public displays of trans­
gressive gender behavior toward regulation of the "uncontrollable li-
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bido" of the homosexual (p. 14). The fear that animated the law was 
that "children's budding sexuality" (p. 14) would be exploited or cor­
rupted if homosexuality were to go unchecked or unpunished; the 
prevalent legal image of the homosexual became that of sexual aggres­
sor. During this period, "[t]he vampire lesbian and the predatory 
child-molesting (male) homosexual replaced the mannish lesbian and 
the female impersonator as the object of popular and legal concern 
and, starting in the 1930s, hysteria" (p. 14). 
World War II arrested the mounting "hysteria," as the inevitable 
intensities and single-sex stratifications of military service relaxed cus­
tomary social barriers, including those between same-sex colleagues. 
Greater tolerance of male bonding, and a shift in the national gaze to­
ward foreign conflicts rather than domestic, intersocial ones, made 
American life - temporarily - less sexually fraught. Soon after the 
War, however, the federal government reasserted gender barriers with 
a vengeance, and launched an aggressive, anti-homosexual 
"Kulturkampf' that Eskridge parallels to Nazi Germany's antihomo­
sexual Kulturkampf of 1933-1946 (p. 14). Federal officials drummed 
homosexuals out of public office, policed heavily known sites of gay 
congregation, expanded and enforced laws that criminalized sexual 
variation, and otherwise asked, told, and legally pursued gay men and 
lesbians. 
Yet even a Kulturkampf could not eliminate homosexuality. In­
stead, it drove the behaviors underground, and in one of the many 
ironies that mark official attempts to criminalize sexual behavior, it 
"mold[ ed] the context of the double life," and actually may have fos­
tered the very behaviors it most strenuously sought to eradicate (p. 
54). As Eskridge observes: 
[B]y teaching thugs that they could have their way with fairies without 
accountability, the law encouraged their sadism; by teaching fairies that 
they were subhuman, the law inculcated in some of them a victim men­
tality of masochism. For most other homosexuals, the law was less bru­
tal, but it still augmented the excitement of same-sex intimacy by ren­
dering it an intrinsically outlaw form of love. [p. 54] 
The laws also inspired social organization and, eventually, resis­
tance. Concerted action against the negative attitudes toward homo­
sexuality, and against the most oppressive legal rules, emerged in the 
1960s. In 1961, Franklin Kameny founded the Mattachine Society of 
Washington,3 and, at the decade's close, the Stonewall riot erupted.4 
3. "The Mattachine Society was a secret homophile organization founded in 1950 by 
Harry Hay . . . .  " P. 75. The Mattachine Society of Washington was a Washington-based 
chapter founded by Franklin Kameny in 1961. P. 97. This chapter was the first group to in­
sist on legal equality for gay people. P. 98. 
4. See MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL (1993) (describing the Stonewall riot and its 
genesis). 
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Gay rights leaders began to vocally and publicly reject the closeted 
lives the laws had produced, on the ground that "the closet" was 
"nothing more than an 'apartheid' . . . that intrinsically denies equal 
citizenship and human dignity" (p. 15). Lawyers began to challenge 
the aggressive police surveillance of gay meeting places and intrusions 
into private zones, as their clients sought control over public spaces, 
institutions, and communication methods crucial to gay association 
and culture, for example, bars and restaurants, social and educational 
organizations, and literature. They likewise demanded, with far less 
success, equal treatment in employment, military service, immigration 
status, and family rights (p. 15). 
Building on Warren Court decisions that expanded concepts of 
substantive due process (pp. 83-86), procedural due process (pp. 86-
92), freedom of association (pp. 93-95), freedom of speech and press 
(pp. 95-96), and equal protection (p. 97), these litigants slowly earned 
isolated, narrow victories that began to disentangle the law's confla­
tion of gay status, speech, and conduct, as well as its unreflective pun­
ishment of all three. As Eskridge later explains, early victories re­
quired police and prosecutors to observe due process, and expanded 
speech rights of activists. This helped pave the way to the current, 
highly unstable doctrinal moment, in which official discrimination 
based solely on one's status as gay or lesbian is constitutionally sus­
pect,5 but criminalization of the underlying conduct that is most 
strongly as�ociated with that status is arguably allowed.6 
In setting forth this highly compressed synthesis of American law 
from 1881-1981, Eskridge ably compiles and deploys numerous 
accounts of these historical periods. He also offers fresh insight into 
these histories by focusing on the considerable evidence of non­
enforcement of laws regulating sexual conduct. As Eskridge notes, the 
most repressive laws, passed during the most repressive eras, were 
"honored mostly in the breach" (p. 82). Even during the straitlaced, 
aggressively anti-homosexual 1950s, there were voices opposing these 
measures, as proven by the notable example of the prestigious 
American Law Institute's vote to decriminalize consensual sodomy in 
a tentative draft of its Proposed Penal Code (p. 84); deregulatory and 
nonenforcement impulses always coexisted alongside the strongest 
regulatory and enforcement impulses. 
This leads to a relevant and intriguing question that often is under­
explored in historical accounts of antigay regulation: Who wasn't 
prosecuted (and why)? Eskridge, significantly, addresses this puzzle 
5. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding unconstitutional a state constitu­
tional amendment that prohibited local governments from adopting regulations that barred 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). 
6. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia's sodomy statute 
under substantive due process). 
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and observes that race and class often influenced whose sexual non­
conformance was (and still is) allowed to go unnoticed, and whose was 
(and still is) not. He notes that law does not always prosecute those 
who "flaunt" their sexuality; sometimes it does, and sometimes it does 
not. Homosexual men are, Eskridge scoffs, "ridiculously easy to 
catch" (pp. 65, 227). Yet "for every homosexual arrest there were tens 
of thousands of unarrested homosexual acts" (p. 82; emphasis added). 
Why? 
Eskridge's simple and sensible answer is that full enforcement of 
the anti-homosexual measures "would have been grossly expensive to 
carry out properly, rested upon questionable and sometimes wacky 
ideas, and - critically - included middle-class white men in [their] 
dragnet" (pp. 82-83). Moreover, the enforcement of these laws often 
had ironic, boomerang results: "[These laws] generated [their own] 
opposition" by outing gay people, creating "shared identity" among 
them, and eliciting anger and support among sympathetic nonhetero­
sexuals" (p. 83). Indeed, anti-homosexual regulations and the under­
lying animus that may explain them actually "create[d] a homosexual 
rights movement" (p. 83; emphasis added), a claim that should give 
aggressively antigay legislators pause. 
II. 
In his second segment, Eskridge turns to the contemporary 
American legal scene, within which "gay people remain second-class 
citizens" (p. 139). He analyzes the prohibition of same-sex marriage, 
criminal statutes that still prohibit same-sex intimacy (especially 
consensual sodomy), family law presumptions against child custody or 
adoption rights for gay parents, the United States Military's exclusion 
of openly gay service people, exclusion of sexual orientatiqn from the 
forms of prohibited discrimination under federal, state, and local 
antidiscrimination laws, and the various federal, state, and local 
policies that prohibit teaching that homosexuality or same-sex 
intimacy are acceptable - policies that Eskridge wryly terms "no 
promo homo" provisions (pp. 139-40). 
Eskridge frames this legal analysis with overarching observations 
about law and social change. First, "evolution in public law is driven, 
but not predetermined, by changes in society and culture generally, 
and changing social and political power in particular" (p. 141) . Thus, 
for example, the law's transition from criminalization of cross-dressing 
to its forgoing of these forms of gender policing was not a matter of 
doctrinal logic, but the result of changing views about, and wider 
awareness of, gay lives, gay identities, and collective gay interests (p. 
142). 
Second, law plays a role in how we talk and think about sexual 
variation (p. 143). It influences the governing rhetoric, and thus can 
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shift the public and private focus away from pathologizing these varia­
tions to assigning people rights based on these sexual variations. 
Taken together, these insights suggest- sensibly enough- that any 
future legal transitions, such as decriminalizing same-sex intimacy, 
permitting gay people to serve in the military, or authorizing domestic 
partnerships, will depend upon a cultural shift toward greater accep­
tance of same-sex relationships and legal rhetoric that promotes such 
acceptance. 
In support of his more controversial assertion that law can effect 
social transformation, Eskridge points to the Warren Court case law 
on freedom of speech and constitutional criminal procedure, which 
enabled gay people to "come out" with less fear that police and cen­
sors would punish them (p. 147). These legal decisions influenced so­
cial practices in positive ways that Eskridge believes belie more skep­
tical accounts of courts' power to effect significant social change. 7 
Correlatively, of course, law can have a significant negative impact on 
gay lives. Cases like Bowers v. Hardwick8 actually may promote clos­
eted behaviors by treating homosexuals as presumptive sodomites, 
rather than as co-citizens (p. 146). That is, law acts as an independent 
variable that affects gay people's lives (p. 145), for good or bad, not­
withstanding the powerful role of factors external to law. 
Eskridge urges that legal and social forces should tolerate sexual 
variation and destigmatize homosexuality. Specifically, he argues that 
"there is nothing about gender and sexual variation that justifies legal 
discrimination and . . .  the public culture ought to implement the prin­
ciple of benign sexual variation by recognizing equal rights for gay 
people" (p. 147). This would mean "state nondiscrimination as to gay 
people, state neutrality as to these sexual variations, and state insis­
tence on nondiscrimination in the marketplace" (p. 147). If the state 
endorses these gay equality ends, then the stigma attached to sexual 
orientation will slowly disappear (p. 147), an end that Eskridge de­
sires. 
*** 
Having set forth these descriptive claims about law's role in 
shaping social practices, and a normative touchstone for critiquing this 
role, Eskridge then turns to specific examples of antigay regulation. 
He begins with Hardwick, and details the familiar critiques of the 
7. The well-known contemporary work that casts doubt on the United Supreme Court's 
influence on social change is GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS 
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 39-169 (1991). Rosenberg writes, "I have found little evi­
dence that the judicial system ... produced much of the massive change in civil rights that 
swept the United States in the 1960s." Id. at 157. 
8. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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Court's logic, use of precedent, presentation of history, constitutional 
interpretation methodology, and empirical analysis (pp. 149-66). 
Eskridge concludes that Hardwick fails on all of these fronts, but 
particularly violates doctrinal logic. 
Hardwick fails as a matter of substantive privacy, because that 
doctrine teaches that "the state has no business in the bedrooms of 
consenting adults" even if what they are doing there is "disgusting" (p. 
173). Sodomy laws also violate freedom of expression principles, 
because they censor expressive conduct on a content-specific basis.9 
Eskridge maintains that "sex is uniquely communicative" (p. 177) and 
is clearly "no less - and sometimes a great deal more - commun­
icative than erotic dancing, flag-burning, and wearing hate symbols" 
(p. 178). Talking about and engaging in sex thus deserve First 
Amendment scrutiny because both may promote the libertarian values 
of autonomy and self-expression (pp. 178-79), as well as the dem­
ocracy-enhancing values of citizen education, tolerance, and robust 
public debate about public issues (pp. 180-82). Moreover, to the 
extent that the First Amendment prohibits content- and viewpoint­
based censorship, it promotes equality values, which Eskridge believes 
point against allowing the State to selectively punish gay sexual ex­
pression (pp. 182-83). 
Anticipating reproaches that a great deal of conduct is similarly 
expressive but not treated as protected speech; that freedom of ex­
pression has never been unlimited for anyone in the military, on the 
job, or in many other contexts crucial to gay rights; and that the pri­
vacy of others may be infringed unduly if gay sexual expression is 
deemed protected speech, Eskridge offers a brief reply. He concedes 
that slippery slope objections are the "most intellectually serious" 
ones, but says that the Supreme Court already has begun the slide to­
ward "sexualizing" the First Amendment by acknowledging that erotic 
dancing has expressive content.10 Why this alleged sexual slide should 
continue, however, is more assumed by Eskridge than shown. 
Eskridge acknowledges that courts typically defer to the military, 
to employers, or to other government actors who manage controlled 
environments. He adds, however, that the government's ability to 
suppress such speech is restrained by the prohibition against viewpoint 
discrimination, and by a more constitutionally pervasive obligation to 
9. Here, Eskridge draws on his earlier work with a former colleague. See David Cole & 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of 
Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319 {1994). 
10. Pp. 176-77; see also City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 120 S. Ct. 1382 (2000) (concluding 
that nudity is not inherently expressive, but nude dancing is expressive conduct); Barnes v. 
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 {1991) {plurality opinion) (suggesting that nude 
dancing is expressive conduct, though it falls within the outer ambit of First Amendment 
protection). 
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act reasonably.11 Antigay policies fail to satisfy either requirement. 
For example, Eskridge argues, the military "unit cohesion" defense of 
its "don't ask, don't tell" policy, is neither reasonable nor evenly 
enforced. It is also belied by the analogous American experience with 
racially integrated troops. Unit cohesion was not undermined by 
racial integration of soldiers, despite the strong fears to the contrary 
that were advanced to resist this change. Moreover, the First 
Amendment's distaste for allowing a "heckler's veto" to silence a 
speaker (p. 191) points against regulation of gay sexual expression. 
The military or other government actors therefore should not permit 
straight people's hostility to gay people to stifle the gay people's open 
expression of their identities. 
Eskridge scoffs at claims that open expression of sexual identity 
would burden the privacy interests of straight people, even in the con­
fines of the military barracks. Straight soldiers already risk whatever 
loss of privacy may come from close living (including showering) with 
closeted gay soldiers (p. 193); this loss of privacy is only veiled, not re­
duced, by a policy that prohibits people from revealing their identities. 
Eskridge then suggests that the real motive behind the military's 
antigay policy is actually far more complex than any of the military's 
commonly advanced but implausible explanations. It is that "homo­
sexual attraction may be useful to the unit cohesion of same-sex units, 
but only so long as the existence of a sexual feature to this bonding 
can be plausibly denied" (p. 194; emphasis added). "Don't ask, don't 
tell" helps the military preserve a delicate, unspoken sexual balance 
among its members, which preserves the military's sexual identity, and 
makes the close quarters and same-sex intimacies of service life less 
fraught (p. 194). 
To this last, provocative justification for suppressing open expres­
sion of service people's sexual identity, Eskridge responds, in essence, 
"get over it." Open expression of sexuality- whether among soldiers 
or among other citizens - simply would not release a "Devlin-Scalia 
parade of horribles" (p. 197), undermine troop morale, or erode public 
morality. Nor would the First Amendment's central purpose as a 
safeguard of political speech somehow be diluted by affording sexual 
expression full free speech protection (pp. 197-99). The slippery slope 
concern is overstated, says Eskridge, because other sexual conduct still 
would receive First Amendment scrutiny, not, necessarily, insulation 
from regulation. Moreover, deregulating sexual expression might 
pave the way to "sexual discourse without hysteria," "yield more sex­
ual peace and less sexual neurosis" (p. 195), and highlight wider 
anomalies in free expression jurisprudence (p. 200). For example, the 
11. Pp. 188-89. See, e.g., Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 
677-78 (1998) (recognizing that even in a "nonpublic" forum, the government regulation of 
speech must be reasonable in light of the purpose of the property). 
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treatment of obscenity as "unprotected" speech might be revisited 
(pp. 200-01). Again, government might still be permitted to regulate 
obscenity and pornography (pp. 203-04), but only if the regulation 
could withstand First Amendment strict scrutiny.12 
Finally, Eskridge makes equal protection-based objections to 
antigay measures that overlap with his privacy and freedom of expres­
sion arguments, insofar as equal protection too requires that classifica­
tions based on sexual orientation be rational. It also requires that the 
classifications not rest solely on prejudicial stereotyping or resort to 
rigid gender roles or animus. Eskridge states that "responses to sexual 
or gender variation can usually be categorized as driven by either mo­
rality (homosexuality is an abomination) or animus (I hate queers)" 
(p. 210). Although the former may be a legitimate basis for regula­
tion, per Hardwick, the latter is an improper basis for regulation, per 
the Court's recent decision in Romer v. Evans.13 
Romer held that Colorado's Amendment 2, which prohibited 
adoption of any state law that banned discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, violated the Equal Protection Clause.14 The Court 
viewed the amendment as a "status-based enactment divorced from 
any factual context from which [the Court] could discern a relation­
ship to legitimate state interests,"15 and insisted that any antigay law 
must rest on an assertion of something more than "popular animosity" 
(p. 151). That is, the State must show that the disfavored class of peo­
ple is committing harm, a harm that must be demonstrable; the regula­
tion may not flow from mere animus or, as Eskridge puts it, "hysteri­
cal and obsessional fears" of gay people (p. 225). 
The State likewise cannot rely on justifications that conflict with 
the Court's other case law, for example its prohibition of official en­
forcement of fixed gender roles (p. 222). Rather, antigay regulations 
now must bear some relation "to ability to perform or contribute to so­
ciety" (p. 217; emphasis added). This is a quite different, more diffi­
cult standard for the State to meet than the standard deployed in 
Hardwick, where the Court upheld Georgia's criminalization of "ho­
mosexual sodomy" on the basis of historical condemnation of homo-
12. According to Eskridge, sexualizing the First Amendment also might force the Court 
to address a First Amendment "paradox, " under which courts are most vigilant in protecting 
political expression in a public setting, while "most vigilant in protecting sexual expression in 
a private setting." P. 200 (emphasis added). This paradox reflects, among other things, the 
ways in which sex and intimacy are deemed intrinsically private in the United States. P. 201. 
Eskridge maintains that protecting sexual expression in the public sphere would erode this 
public/private dichotomy, which not only might free gay sexual expression for public expres­
sion, but might protect more political speech in private settings. 
13. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
14. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
15. Id. at 635. 
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sexuality.16 Eskridge thus concludes - correctly, in my view17 - that 
Romer cannot be squared with the antigay logic of Hardwick (pp. 150, 
151, 210-11). 
Eskridge advocates that courts resolve this tension by overruling 
or narrowly construing Hardwick, given the historical materials re­
garding the futility and occasional brutality of antigay regulations. In 
any event, he believes that the animus feature of antigay legislation 
will often be more powerful than any public morality feature. More­
over, the Court in Romer rejected Colorado's stated reasons for up­
holding Amendment 2, which included conservation of scarce re­
sources for enforcing civil rights, the interest of landlords and employ­
ers in not associating with gay people, and the State's interest in 
conveying disapproval of homosexuality (p. 209). These interests, 
Eskridge notes, clearly were more weighty than "antihomosexual sen­
timent held to be a rational basis for sodomy laws in Bowers v. 
Hardwick" (p. 209). Eskridge believes that the rhetoric and reason of 
Romer, not of Hardwick, eventually will prevail, as changes in society 
and culture continue to erode an unblinking belief in the "unnatural" 
harm of homosexuality. Legal doctrine will shift to prohibiting official 
discrimination on the basis of homosexuality, because homosexuality 
causes no demonstrable harm that satisfies the Romer test. 
What Eskridge does not consider is that the Romer shift in judicial 
rhetoric - which demands a showing of reasons for antigay policies -
could have adverse consequences. To approve an antigay measure, 
post-Romer, courts must declare the measure to be "rational." This 
could lend a different, more worrisome rhetorical force to official in­
tolerance of, or animosity toward, gay people (it may be harsher to 
call an antigay measure "rational" than to simply uphold it on the 
ground that it has "ancient roots," as the Court did in 
Hardwick).18 Eskridge nevertheless appeals to judicial reason, by as­
serting that 
laws focusing on homosexuality or gay people have usually been moti­
vated by hysterical, obsessional, or narcissistic and not public-regarding, 
fact-based reasoning; have repeatedly proven to be socially unproductive 
laws that either wreak policy havoc or waste state resources or (if unen­
forced) simply serve as symbolic spite measures; and focus on a class of 
people subject to unjustified social scorn and violence, whose unfair 
16. The Court in Hardwick invoked the "ancient roots" of proscriptions on homosexuals 
as a basis for its refusal to invalidate the Georgia sodomy law. See 478 U.S. at 192. As the 
Court further stated, "[t]he law ... is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws 
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, 
the courts will be very busy indeed." Id. at 196. 
17. See Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 88 (1996). 
18. See id. at 86-87, 93-94, 102-09 (discussing several potential problems with a rational 
basis strategy). 
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plight has typically been worsened by state brutalization and stigma. [p. 
217] 
The passage implicitly assumes that the enumerated flaws of antigay 
regulation will be recognized as such by judges, and that judicial rul­
ings against these laws will produce positive social change for gay peo­
ple. 
Eskridge bolsters this rational basis argument against antigay 
measures with arguments that discrimination against gays and lesbians 
must be supported by "exceedingly persuasive justification[s],"19 be­
cause it is a form of gender discrimination. He then applies these mul­
tiple principles to the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples, 
and concludes that these denials are unconstitutional, per the equal 
protection logic of Loving v. Virginia.20 The Court in Loving prohib­
ited states from denying marriage licenses to interracial couples (p. 
219). In both the interracial and the same-sex marriage examples, 
similarly situated actors arguably are treated "alike" (i.e., no one can 
marry outside of his or her race; no one can marry a person of the 
same sex). Marriage is not - the argument continues - inherently 
monoracial, inherently procreative, or inherently heterosexual. The 
prohibitions therefore are best explained by other, constitutionally il­
legitimate motives - i.e., to preserve white supremacy, in the case of 
antimiscegenation laws, and to preserve traditional gender roles and 
heterosexuality supremacy, in the case of laws that restrict marriage li­
censes to male/female partners.21 
Before concluding his cumulatively powerful arguments against 
antigay laws, however, Eskridge equivocates. If allowing same-sex 
marriage or openly gay people to serve in the military is too politically 
unpopular, he cautions, then the Court might, and perhaps should, 
simply dodge these issues, whether by denying certiorari or by main­
taining, a la Hardwick, that the political process should determine 
these prohibitions' fate. He then inserts still another caveat: this last 
move too would expend judicial political capital. (If, for example, the 
Court upholds "don't ask, don't tell," on the ground that the military 
alone should decide issues of troop cohesion and effectiveness, then 
the Court must justify that conclusion; "[a]n analytically or factually 
flawed opinion would open the Court to harsh criticism" (p. 229); 
19. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (holding that equal protection 
precluded Virginia from reserving exclusively to men the unique educational opportunities 
of Virginia Military Institute) (quoting Mississippi Univ. Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 
(1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
20. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia's miscegenation laws on equal protection 
and substantive due process grounds). 
21. Pp. 220-28. There is a rich subliterature within contemporary work on gay rights 
that takes up the controversial subject of same-sex marriage. For an elaboration of 
Eskridge's views and the applicable constitutional arguments, see EsKRIDGE, CASE FOR 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 2. 
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similar to the resounding criticism it received for Hardwick.) The saf­
est course among these perilous ones thus may be to engage in 
Bickelian "not doing,"22 and allow experimentation among the states, 
at least in areas like same-sex marriage, where state constitutional is­
sues dominate.23 
III. 
In his final, most troubling segment, Eskridge moves beyond his­
torical and contemporary legal frames to argue that gay experiences 
and queer theory might, or should, shape not only future gender law, 
but future general jurisprudence. He plunges into a morass of con­
flicting theories and perspectives, including (but not limited to) liber-
22. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEASf DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURTATTHEBAROFPOLITICS 169 (1962) (describing the Court's "techniques of 'not do­
ing,' devices for disposing of a case while avoiding judgment on the constitutional issue it 
raises"). 
23. These state-level developments are well under way, as the Vermont Supreme Court 
held in December of 1999, in Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). The court held that the 
common benefits clause of the Vermont Constitution requires that the Vermont legislature 
confer the same benefits upon same-sex couples as it grants to married couples, on the 
ground that "legal protection and security for their avowed commitment to an intimate and 
lasting human relationship is simply, when all is said and done, a recognition of our common 
humanity." 744 A.2d at 889. This judicial act of will and grace is counterpoised, of course, 
by legislative measures in other states that expressly prohibit same-sex marriage; in Vermont 
itself, the legislative response was not to sanction gay marriage, but to move toward domes­
tic partnerships that confer the same benefits on same-sex couples as are conferred upon 
married couples. 
In any event, this "safest course" for, the United States Supreme Court is no longer 
available in some areas, such as in the Title VII context, where the Court already has 
addressed whether same-sex harassment is an actionable form of sex discrimination. See 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding same-sex harassment 
is actionable if similar harassment of a different sex victim would not have been tolerated by 
the employer). Unless the Court later concludes that discrimination "on the basis of sex" 
means something quite different under Title VII than it does under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, then these Title VII developments are very likely to influence constitutional 
rights as well as statutory ones. To frame two different definitions of what constitutes dis­
crimination "on the basis of sex" would be a quite different distinction between statutory 
and constitutional rights than it was for the Court to frame two different standards for 
establishing a Fourteenth Amendment violation and a Title VII violation. See Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that the racially disparate impact of a facially race­
neutral measure does not, absent evidence of intent to discriminate, trigger strict scrutiny, 
and contrasting this constitutional standard with the stricter standards of Title VII, which do 
not require a showing of intent). 
Still another area where the Court has chosen to act, rather than to wait and see, in­
volves the fuzzy zone between public antidiscrimination laws and private associational and 
expressive freedom. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual, Inc., 515 
U.S. 557 (1995) (holding that public accommodations law could not be applied to compel 
private group to include gay and lesbian group in St. Patrick's Day parade). The Court's 
pending case reviewing the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision that the Boy Scouts can­
not exclude gay youths and adults from positions of leadership also will address this tension, 
and could further restrict government's power to prohibit antigay private conduct. See Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 865 (2000), granting cert. to 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999). 
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alism, pragmatism, progressive postliberalism, and feminism - all 
covered over with a mossy romanticism. 
I will first summarize the arguments of this third segment, before 
turning to why I find the segment baffling on many levels. According 
to Eskridge, the guide to the future is "queer theory," which by his ac­
count "starts with the assumption that gender, sexuality, and perhaps 
even sex are social constructions and not natural givens" (p. 444 n.1). 
Obviously, this insight destabilizes the natural-law assumptions behind 
the legal regulation of sex, and requires a reconsideration not only of 
laws against homosexuality, but of consensual sadomasochism, 
intergenerational sex, incest, and more. Even these forms of sexual 
expression, which are unlikely to obtain legal protection, would re­
ceive a new analysis - one mindful of the tendency of sexual regula­
tions to "yield a costly dynamic and . . .  contribute to the ongoing tra­
dition of sex negativity in America" (p. 258). 
This tradition of sex negativity springs in part, Eskridge suggests, 
from the "hysterical," "obsessional," and "narcissistic" impulses that 
undergird the legal and social suppression of sexual nonconformity 
(pp. 224-25, 298). A more sensible and humane legal regime would 
grant "full equality" to gay people (p. 320), and would embrace "be­
nign sexual variation" just as it has embraced the idea of "benign re­
ligious variation" (p. 293). The State should restrain itself "from en­
gaging in public anti-religious or antigay censorship or discrimination" 
and should "prohibit private censorship or discrimination on the basis 
of religion or sexual orientation" (p. 302; emphasis added). 
The liberalism that Eskridge endorses elsewhere - with its stress 
on the state's negative obligations, i.e., noninterference with basic life 
decisions, privacy, freedom of expression, and procedural due process 
- seems out of place in this brave new world. Yet Eskridge betrays 
his ambivalence about abandoning altogether a theory that may fur­
ther gay equality aims. Indeed, he observes that if the basic assump­
tion of queer theory is wrong, and sexual identity is innate, then "the 
liberal arguments retain almost full strength[, because then] compul­
sory heterosexuality cruelly stigmatizes and penalizes gay people for 
traits they cannot control, and hurts nongay people who enter into un­
fulfilling relationships with closeted gays" (p. 284; emphasis added). 
There is an awkward embrace at this point - if liberalism can do the 
work of advancing gay equality, then it may be the weapon of choice. 
But Eskridge then recites the practical limitations of a liberal ap­
proach to sexual variation. First is that American law does not pursue 
liberalism principles to their logical limits, despite its ostensible com­
mitment to liberalism (p. 245). If it did, certain consensual acts that 
now are criminalized would not be, including consensual sodomy be­
tween adult, same-sex partners, but also - perhaps - consensual for­
nication, incest, and adultery, among others (p. 247). Eskridge's ex­
planation for this lapse is that "consensual choice is not, even in our 
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liberal society, separable from recognized statuses" (p. 250). Em­
ployment laws recognize, for example, that higher-status partners may 
coerce lower-status partners to consent to sex, and criminal laws seek 
to prevent other potentially nonconsensual sex, such as sex with a mi­
nor (pp. 250-51). The law also reflects the status of traditional mar­
riage and heterosexuality by preventing same-sex adult partners from 
marrying or from engaging in sexual relations. 
Eskridge's next turn is the most destabilizing. Liberalism not only 
is imperfectly achieved in American law, but it is also an inherently 
flawed model for civil rights. The right to be "let alone"24 by the State 
may allow and even promote the ways in which private institutions of­
ten can, and do, punish nonconformity. Moreover, "[h]uman beings 
are not autonomous bundles of exogenously defined preferences 
seeking satisfaction .... [but] are social beings struggling to make con­
nections with one another" (p. 283). In family contexts, this limitation 
of liberal theory is particularly striking. 
Eskridge concludes that liberalism's notion that a noninterven­
tionist state is the best means of maximizing gay autonomy must be 
qualified: some legal interventions are necessary to prevent private 
abuses of gays. Again, the State must restrain itself from interfering 
with sexual variation, and must prevent private actors from interfering 
with sexual variation. In doing both, it should invoke as a substantive 
backstop the "relational" value of protecting same-sex relationships, 
i.e., these relationships benefit the adult couples and their children 
(pp. 285-88). It also should also focus on feminist discourse that em­
phasizes "sexual mutuality" (p. 268) as the normative measure of sex 
worthy of legal or social approval, which he says - unfortunately and 
risibly in my view - has "a procedural component."25 These proce­
dural steps - a species of notice and opportunity to be heard - "en­
tail[] a conversation about what one enjoys and what one does not 
enjoy, and ... stopping when ... one says 'stop' or a safe word" (p. 
269). 
Eskridge tries to soften the clash between his postliberal, norma­
tive claims, and his liberal, noninterventionist arguments by insisting 
on their shared gaylaw ends: 
[A]rguments for gay families ... rest on something more profound than 
choice . . . . [G]ay families are good for gay people and good for Amer-
24. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) 
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478) (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
25. P. 269. I appreciate the important function of "safe words" in sexual encounters, 
particularly in the shadowy and potentially dangerous realm of sadomasochistic encounters 
or sex between relative strangers. Yet this description of sex as having a "procedural com­
ponent" made me chuckle. Procedural due process concepts and terminology play an impor­
tant role in many venues, but the bedroom is not obviously among them. Perhaps my resis­
tance to proceduralizing sex is itself based on romanticism, . not reason, but I resist 
nonetheless. 
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ica because they provide fora in which people form mutual commitment 
and children are reared. Any effort by the state to discourage gay fami­
lies is perverse because it discourages commitment and harms children." 
[p. 278; emphasis added] 
The policies are also wrong because they invade privacy and individ­
ual autonomy. 
Note well the profound shift - "gay" is not just a sexual variation 
that a liberal state should tolerate and, as necessary, protect from 
those who are "disgusted" by it; rather, gay is good. Moreover, 
Eskridge elaborates, "sex is good and normal when the participants 
welcome it, when the sex is truly a joint enterprise meeting the needs of 
the partners" (p. 170; emphasis added). 
He then weaves away from this normative defense of gay sexual 
equality, back to his pragmatic argument for deregulating sexual varia­
tion. Criminal laws against gay sexual conduct are a "wast[ e] [of] 
valuable human resources that could be expended in producing and 
problem-solving" (p. 308). Liberals, progressive postliberals, and 
pragmatists therefore all should agree to this much - that antigay 
regulations are "bad policy." 
Eskridge doesn't forget the feminists. Much antigay animus, he 
argues, springs from an insistence on traditional gender stereotypes. 
Consequently, legalization of same-sex marriage, overruling of Hard­
wick, allowing openly gay service people into the military, preventing 
sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace, awarding gay par­
ents child custody and adoption rights, and possibly allowing "poly­
parenting" and other unconventional family arrangements also would 
promote the social and legal interests of women. That is, to defy the 
traditional gender stereotypes that constrain gay and lesbian lives 
would, perforce, erode the traditional gender stereotypes that con­
strain many female lives, insofar as they too are premised on negative 
and mistaken assumptions about the role of gender in shaping human 
abilities, roles, and natures. 
*** 
Eskridge closes this theoretically dense segment with a proposed 
methodology for recognizing the rights of gays and lesbians while still 
respecting the interests of heterosexuals. His model comes from the 
clash at Georgetown University when gay and lesbian student groups 
sought recognition and benefits equal to other student groups.26 In­
voking its Jesuit roots, Georgetown refused. The students sued under 
the District of Columbia's Human Rights Act forbidding the denial of 
educational facilities based on sexual orientation.27 No court could 
26. See Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (en bane). 
27. Seep. 303; Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 4. 
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resolve this conflict without denying what Eskridge calls the "nomic" 
community interests of one of these litigants. To honor Georgetown's 
sense of its Jesuit origin and identity would be to deny the student 
groups equal participation in the life of the University. To honor the 
students' participation interests would be to violate Georgetown's 
interest in shaping its religious identity. Either way, the court would 
be forced to choose between "nomic" communities. A similarly dif­
ficult choice must be made between nomic communities when a 
Presbyterian landlord refuses to rent an apartment to an unmarried 
couple, or when the Hibernian Order bans openly gay participants 
from its annual St. Patrick's Day parade.28 In each scenario, disrespect 
of some group's values will result regardless of the outcome. 
Eskridge argues that in such intractable situations, judges should 
try to accommodate the colliding perspectives, rather than choose one 
side as the all-out winner and deem the other side the loser (p. 310). 
The opponents in the controversy likewise should try to accommodate 
each other, by respecting "the central need of the other, unless that 
accommodation would sacrifice that side's central need . . . . [E]ach 
side should remain open to information about the other and to the 
common interests that are still shared" (pp. 311-12), with as much re­
spect for others' points of views as their differing commitments and 
self-respect may allow. An apt illustration of this accommodationist 
approach, says Eskridge, was the court's decision in the Georgetown 
case "to require Georgetown to provide the student groups with equal 
access and benefits but not to require it to grant official recognition to 
the groups" (p. 303). Eskridge states that the strength of the opinion 
was that it "value[d] the claims of both nomoi" (p. 303). He does not 
explain, however, how to weigh each set of nomic values, or how to re­
solve cases in which any compromise among group interests may be 
experienced not as Solomonic, but as an intolerable loss to all groups 
concerned. The depth and intensity of nomic differences may not al­
ways permit accommodation or allow the parties to see their common 
interests. The method also presupposes a judge who can identify and 
will value the central needs of both nomoi. Such emphatic skills are 
wonderful judicial (and human) qualities, but are unevenly distributed 
among us. Nevertheless, Eskridge's accommodationist model is a very 
appealing one for groups that seek recognition and tolerance as a first 
step toward acceptance. 
28. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 556 (holding that applying public acco=odations law to re­
quire defendants to include gay and lesbian group in St. Patrick's Day parade violated First 
Amendment rights of parade organizers). 
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N. 
Eskridge makes several assertions in his final segment that are 
hard to square with some of the insights of the preceding segments. 
First is the assertion of the "good" in what Eskridge describes, often in 
the singular, as "gay experience" (pp. 244, 259, 269, 323). Second is 
the celebration of nomic pluralism and apparent embrace of postlib­
eral theory. Third is his psychopathological account of antigay am­
mus. Let me take these in order. 
Eskridge's historical and legal discussions suggest that a central 
explanation for law's irrational treatment of sexual variation is that 
legislators and judges, along with the rest of us, persistently fail to 
perceive (let alone tolerate, accept, or celebrate) the full range and 
complexities of individual sexual desires. This is a profound point that 
is best apprehended if one stands back and observes how woodenly 
the law has responded to sexual complexities over time. History 
shows that law has resorted to blunt regulatory measures that attempt 
to construct, cabin, and eradicate particular categories of sexual var­
iation. Law also has ascribed meanings to these variations that are 
one-dimensional and reductive, and that are invariably negative. If 
Eskridge's theory about law's rhetorical force holds true, then legal 
history has helped to create what people, including gay men and 
women, think "gay" means. This makes any positive account of "gay 
experience" problematic, because these experiences are potentially 
tainted by the stunted and negative legal constructions. 
Moreover, Eskridge's use of the terms "gaylaw" and "gay experi­
ence" in the third segment departs significantly and confusingly from 
his use of these terms in the first two segments. In his historical and 
doctrinal segments, "gaylaw" refers to the law's definition and pun­
ishment of a changing assortment of sexual outlaws. Here we meet 
the "gay" person as gender bender, the "ridiculously easy to catch" 
violator of sodomy laws, a member of a "homophile group," any fe­
male softball team member, any "gay bar" patron, a female inmate 
who "weds" her partner in a mock prison rite, and an apparently "de­
lighted" minor male engaged in sodomy with an older man (p. 88). 
The "gay" person is also the member of a same-sex couple denied a 
marriage license, the soldier booted out because of doubt about his or 
her heterosexuality, a "sodomite," a guidance counselor who says she 
is bisexual,29 and a man holding hands with another man in the park. 
"Gaylaw" refers both to the regulations of these "gay" people and 
to the (mostly unsuccessful) judicial challenges of the regulations. 
29. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) {holding 
that a public high school guidance counselor's statement regarding her sexual preference was 
not made as a citizen speaking out on a public matter, and that her resulting discharge was 
unconstitutional). 
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"Gay experience," one must assume, was distorted and cramped by 
these harsh legal constructions of "gay," or else the closet metaphor 
would not have such gloomy resonance. In any event, "gaylaw" his­
torically has not denoted a fixed, unitary status or conduct, and it cer­
tainly has not been affirming of gay identity. 
Eskridge seems to repress this history and its dark connotations 
when he invokes the term "gaylaw" to denote law as it might be trans­
formed by "gay experience" and infuses this experience with entirely 
positive attributes. He states that gay experience "decouple[s] [sex] 
from procreation" and links it instead "to its social function of deep­
ening human relationships" (p. 240). "Gay families" are "families of 
choice" and "gaylaw views sex as good and not shameful, public as 
well as private" (p. 240). "Gaylaw" further denotes law that takes as a 
normative baseline the experiences of gay people, who are all engaged 
in relationships founded on principles of mutuality, respect, and love. 
Again, "gay" is not just a sexual variation that a liberal state should 
tolerate and, as necessary, protect from those who are "disgusted" by 
it; rather, gay is good. Yet this optimistic and monolithic description 
of contemporary gay experience cannot be right, unless the past hos­
tility documented by Eskridge has had no negative psychosocial con­
sequences for these relationships, or distorting effects on their mean­
ings, which Eskridge forcefully denies. 
Romanticizing gay relationships also conflicts with Eskridge's ear­
lier plea that we take the "hysterical" out of legal regulation by per­
mitting even "disgusting" private sexual behaviors (p. 173) and "re­
volting" expression (p. 198). To replace sexual "hysteria" with 
approval of gay sexual expression and relationships, on the assump­
tion (or condition) that these relationships are (or must be) founded 
on mutuality, respect, and love, is to reject implicitly the liberal neu­
trality that Eskridge urges in his free speech argument. 
This leads to another troubling aspect of the third segment: 
Eskridge's wide angle, all-theories-in-a-storm approach seriously un­
dermines the book's overall conceptual coherence. For example, his 
embrace of a "relational" approach to family law issues, and of an 
accommodationist approach to clashes between "classic" communities 
is hard to reconcile with his appeal for agnosticism toward outre, indi­
vidual sexual behaviors, or with a strong liberal assignment of indi­
vidual rights. Postliberal skepticism about the distinction between 
omissions and commissions, and about the possibility of state 
"neutrality," greatly weakens arguments against state regulation of 
sexual expression that "disgusts" others. 
For example, if courts were to pitch traditional, liberal definitions 
of what constitutes a regulable, demonstrable harm, state power, to 
prevent aesthetic, social, and other costs of disruptive sexual expres­
sion, could expand. States more easily could assert that sexually ex­
pressive materials and behaviors, such as pornography, sex shops, or 
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cruising, are visual signals that may encourage lawbreaking and other 
harmful secondary effects, as some contemporary accounts claim.30 
Courts that embraced a postliberal approach to these alleged potential 
harms of sexual expression likely would weigh these potential harms 
more heavily in their free speech calculus. A postliberal construction 
of harm thus might produce a very ironic result: revival of the pre-
1900 and early 1900s approach to policing gender deviance (among 
other signals of social "disorder") through stricter anti-loitering, cen­
sorship, zoning, and other laws - laws that Eskridge earlier describes 
as "wacky."31 
The social constructionist insights that Eskridge seems to endorse 
in the third segment thus pose serious structural problems for the tra­
ditional First Amendment principles he touts in the second segment. 
Indeed, a "social constructionist" approach to free speech doctrine 
could lead one to conclude that obscenity law, and the much maligned 
"secondary effects" subcategories within First Amendment case law, 
are the more sensible and appropriate responses to the societal degra­
dation and other harms of sexual expression. That is, case law that 
allows communities to regulate, zone, and criminalize some sexual ex­
pression should inform the rest of First Amendment doctrine (and 
"gaylaw"), not the other way around, as Eskridge would have it. 
Eskridge might have responded to these structural concerns by 
demonstrating how postliberal theory, too, would support the gay sex­
ual expression model proposed in the second segment. Instead, he 
rests his argument for treating sexual conduct as worthy of free speech 
30. This literature is based on the "broken windows" theory of crime first asserted by 
James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, which assumes that visible "disorder" breeds crime, 
and that measures that reassert visual order, such as fixing broken windows and sweeping 
street corners of persons who appear to be gang members, will reduce crime. See James Q. 
Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29. 
31. P. 83. Indeed, the new "order maintenance policing" style of law enforcement 
advocates exactly these sorts of measures to "clean up" neighborhoods. See Bernard E. 
Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of 
Deterrence, The Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 
97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998) (discussing and critiquing order-maintenance policing and the 
"broken windows" thesis); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 
83 VA. L. REV. 349, 357 (1997) (discussing the importance of reducing the visible signs of 
criminal activity, because they reduce the stigma of engaging in crime and thereby promote 
criminal activity). 
For a recent, very insightful analysis of the shift in the rhetoric of "harm" that occurs 
within the new policing measures, see Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Prin­
ciple, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999). Harcourt's exposition suggests that liber­
alism too might be invoked in defense of the new policing measures, given the conservative 
deployment of liberal harm principles. See id. at 161-67. That is, strict anti-loitering laws can 
be defended not as "enforcement of morality" measures, but as measures that prevent 
"harm to others" in a liberal sense. This is because, Harcourt argues, the harm principle "is 
no longer an effective response to conservative proposals to regulate. To the contrary . . .  
harm has become the principal argument for state intervention." Id. at 146. 
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protection exclusively on liberal grounds, with no explanation of how 
that argument survives the critique of liberalism in the third segment. 
Let me be clear: I do not object to Eskridge's use of liberalism 
principles as a matter of doctrinal analysis and proposed litigation 
strategy. Constitutional doctrine itself touts liberal assumptions -
however inconsistently - that do point toward gay equality ends. 
Forcing judicial fidelity to this doctrine is supremely fair and logical. 
What I found so confusing was the selective invocation of liberalism 
within an analysis of government regulation of sexual variations that 
(1) argues against a liberal-traditionalist principle of choice; (2) in­
vokes a normative principle of mutuality as the touchstone of worthy 
sexual relations (p. 269); and (3) validates a status-based defense of 
traditional male-female marriage by observing that "underlying cul­
tural anxieties . . .  cannot be ignored" (p. 278). The strong liberal ar­
gument for a sexualized First Amendment makes little sense if one 
also insists that the liberal version of the self is "too limited," insofar 
as it fails to account for the "relational self' (p. 284). 
Moreover, if we chuck out liberalism's excessive, characteristic re­
spect for individualism, then it becomes harder to justify judicial inter­
ference with the church's or the family's contribution to closeted sexu­
ality (p. 313). Yet to protect and celebrate the value of such "classic" 
nomic communities, as Eskridge does, could afford the most powerful 
among these tremendous influence over gay equality's progress and 
over the fate of the gay, often closeted, members of these communi­
ties. 
Eskridge nevertheless argues against intervention into these pri­
vate associations, despite their antigay commitments, in order to re­
spect the relational value of "classic" nomoi. He never clearly defines 
a "classic" nomoi (p. 313), however, or explains why "nonclassic" ones 
should not receive the same respect (p. 179). "Nonclassic," even 
deeply offensive, nomic communities presumably would promote the 
experimentalism and pluralism functions of the First Amendment that 
Eskridge celebrates (pp. 179-80): Likewise confusing is his caveat that 
respect for subcultural nonioi should occur only "so long as their 
members have the option of separating" (p. 313; emphasis added). 
This is a potentially quite significant restriction of subcultural auton­
omy and of Eskridge's version of postliberal theory, insofar as separa­
tion often is not a viable option for members of many "classic" relig­
ious nomoi. Rather, one who "separates" may be viewed as an 
outcast, a heretic, or damned, not as a respected member of a coequal, 
nomic tribe. Postliberal theories that advocate respectful, full defer­
ence to group identity and autonomy likely would not accept a broadly 
stated "right to separate" restriction on group autonomy. It is tradi­
tional liberal theory, most notably, that insists on the individual's right 
to "separate" (though even liberalism has difficulty with "separation" 
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when it includes secession into illiberal, intolerant associations, com­
munities, or practices32). 
This particular thicket is deadeningly familiar: illiberal philoso­
phies potentially undermine any public principle of tolerance of sexual 
variation, and thus of gay equality, whereas liberal philosophies poten­
tially undermine any private value of physical, economic, and psycho­
logical security for gay people. We already know that liberalism has 
these values and inherent limitations. By ostensibly shifting to 
postliberal theory, then adding a liberal caveat, Eskridge doesn't trav­
erse this bog; he merely sinks deeper. 
Eskridge had several means of portage here, none of them perfect. 
He might have stuck to a liberalism plank, until it ran out, and at that 
point simply observed that no theory is complete - there are trap 
doors everywhere - but that liberalism carries us as far toward gay 
equality ends as the alternatives. Or, he might have simply rejected 
the liberalism plank altogether. Instead, Eskridge rests on a liberalism 
plank in some places, while extending several new planks in others, 
without fully explaining how (or whether) courts might reconcile 
them. 
A fourth, likely better, option might have been to avoid this politi­
cal theory morass altogether, given that it is ultimately unnecessary in 
achieving the legal outcomes that most engage him - for example, 
decriminalizing sodomy; providing legal protection to same-sex rela­
tionships; respecting custody rights of gay and lesbian parents; and al­
lowing openly gay and lesbian military personnel to serve. Liberalism 
plausibly (but not perfectly) supports each of these outcomes (so 
might other theories, by the way33). Introducing multiple and com­
peting political theories detracts from an otherwise compelling, excel­
lent chronicle of the noncontroversial harms that antigay laws cause, 
and blunts the more meaningful, sharper point that these noncontro­
versial harms are not worth incurring or inflicting. 
A final difficulty I had with Eskridge's analysis was his treatment 
of antigay animus. Drawing on the work of Elisabeth Young-Bruehl,34 
Eskridge maintains that much antigay animus resembles racial preju­
dice in its hysterical qualities, resembles anti-Semitism in its obses­
sional qualities, and resembles sexism in its narcissistic qualities, which 
makes homophobia "an all-purpose prejudice" (p. 211). He analo-
32. See ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE 
FROM FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC {1991); Allen Buchanan, Toward a The­
ory of Secession, 101 ETHICS 322 {1991); Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the Art of Separa­
tion, 12 POL. THEORY 315 {1984). 
33. See Massaro, supra note 17, at 92-102 {describing how the economic utilitarianism 
approach of Richard Posner, the natural law approach of John Finnis, and the social con­
structionist approach of Janet Halley may all point toward most of the gay equality ends that 
Eskridge addresses). 
34. ELISABETHYOUNG-BRUEHL, THE ANATOMY OFPREJUDICES {1996). 
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gizes American antigay regulations with Nazism (pp. 80-82) - "[T]he 
Nazi goal was Holocaust, genocide, while the American goal was 
Kulturkampf, erasure" (p. 82) - and argues that the animating psy­
chological impulses of such anti-homosexual urges include "hysterical 
demonization of gay people as dirty sexualized subhuman, obsessional 
fears of gay people as conspiratorial and sexually predatory, and nar­
cissistic desires to reinforce stable heterosexual identity and gender 
roles by bashing gay people" (p. 209). That is, antigay prejudice often 
is the product of a psychologically disturbed and deeply insecure mind, 
not just an ignorant or selectively indifferent one. 
While some versions of antigay animus likely do merit treatment as 
a psychiatric disorder, it is doubtful that all do. Just as misogyny likely 
is less common than is treatment of women in unreflective, reductive 
ways that translate into negative social and economic consequences, 
"homogyny" likely is less common than is treatment of all people ac­
cording to heterosexual norms that translate into quite harmful, but 
often unintended, social and economic consequences for gay people. 
Moreover, human resistance to, and sometimes even violence in the 
face of, ambiguity are well known. Although clinical hysteria, obses­
sion, or narcissism may figure in some of our resistance to sexual am­
biguity and to deviation from conventional gender norms, a more 
complete and complicated picture would focus on humans' general 
discomfort with fuzziness.35 Drawing some lines - including ones be­
tween and among people - is probably inescapable, and may even be 
psychologically healthy, insofar as separation between oneself and 
others is necessary to the development of a mature, nonnarcissistic 
se1f.36 
Normalizing the bases of some human prejudices, however, hardly 
clears the path to gay equality. On the contrary, it throws up more 
roadblocks than it eliminates. It forces us to see - alas - that many 
of the most relevant dividing lines here are ones that shape basic social 
patterns, institutions, and norms. They include the lines between male 
and female, between permission and taboo, between family and non­
family, between domesticated and wild, between law and outlaw, and 
between saved and damned.37 Coloring outside of any of these lines 
35. See, e.g., EVIATAR ZERUBA VEL, THE FINE LINE: MAKING DISTINCTIONS IN 
EVERYDAY LIFE 35-36 (1991) (describing people's aversion to ambiguity). 
36. See FRANCIS J. BROUCEK, SHAME AND THE SELF 41 (1991) (discussing the matura­
tional process of seeing oneself as an object autonomous of others). 
Id. 
37. See Massaro, supra note 17, at 83. This argument is that 
[h ]omosexuality threatens the current social organization not only as it is defined by sexually 
created relationships, but also as it is theologically constructed and, perhaps to a lesser ex­
tent, as it is politically organized. Sexual deviance . . .  poses a triple threat . . . . The homo­
sexual is not merely a gender outlaw, but also a religious heretic and a political seditionist. 
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agitates many of us, to some degree. Coloring outside all of them agi­
tates most of us, not just the unbalanced homophobe who kills in re­
sponse to this agitation. Moreover, this agitation is not easily charac­
terized as irrational in a clinical sense, though reliance on it by 
government might be irrational in a liberal, legal sense. 
Defining this liberal, legal meaning of "irrational" is extremely im­
portant in fashioning constitutional arguments for gay equality, given 
the Supreme Court's judicial unwillingness to apply elevated judicial 
scrutiny to classifications other than ones that already have been re­
ceiving such scrutiny. This foreclosure of any new "strict" or "inter­
mediate" scrutiny routes for overturning discriminatory measures ef­
fectively forces litigants down the "rational basis" path of review, 
which will, I predict, excite considerable scholarly, judicial, and law­
yerly interest in defining legislative "irrationality." Eskridge's psy­
chological approach to irrationality is not helpful to this legal inquiry, 
because it is both too narrow and too broad. 
In any event, there is considerable irony (though also undeniable 
symmetry) in psychologizing antigay animus and the people who act 
on it. Same-sex erotic desires only recently shook off their own psy­
chopathological fetters.38 Freeing same-sex desires and experiences 
from their legal shackles, and from the residual social stigma and 
shame, is not obviously furthered by reverse psychological labeling of 
those people who are discomfited by, or even angrily resistant to, sex­
ual variation.39 
v. 
Gaylaw's many virtues and its occasional weaknesses may point 
the way toward a workable, even winnable, technique for challenging 
38. The shift occurred in 1973, when the American Psychiatric Association formally de­
clared that homosexuality "does not constitute a psychiatric disorder" and "implies no im­
pairment in judgment, stability, reliability, or general social or vocational capabilities." See 
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (DSM-II) § 302.0, at 44 (6th prtg. 1974); Resolution of the American Psychiatric 
Association, Dec. 15, 1973, reprinted in 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 497 (1974). 
39. Pathologizing antigay animus also fits awkwardly into the book's overarching gener­
osity toward communities that oppose homosexuality. Eskridge is remarkably charitable 
throughout the book, even when describing regulations that criminalize consensual same-sex 
intimacy, that terminate distinguished and honorable careers in the military and public sec­
tor, and that otherwise inflict countless psychological, physical, and economic harms on gay 
people. He betrays great respect for Georgetown's Jesuit traditions, despite their harsh ap­
plication to its gay and lesbian students. In some other passages, he betrays less patience 
with antigay impulses and derides· opponents of gay rights. For example, he comments, 
amidst his otherwise formal litany of the historical legal suppression of gay people, that ho­
mosexuals have been viewed as "dangerous 'pod people' out of the popular movie The Inva­
sion of the Body Snatchers," p. 60, and that "antihomosexual terror in America . . . .  rested 
upon . . .  wacky ideas," pp. 82-83. But these are gentle, droll gibes - gibes that hardly com­
pare to the stern condemnation in the passages that deploy a psycho-topology of antigay 
animus. 
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antigay measures. Gay equality appeals in this next legal era should 
hammer home the impressive historical and contemporary evidence of 
the ineffectiveness of legal regulation of sexuality. Romer likely is the 
best doctrinal cover for these legal appeals, because the Romer 
framework is so spare, and thus may avoid theory snarls that might 
discourage judicial intervention. Most of the antigay regulations that 
Eskridge opposes could be toppled by a Romer-based, pragmatic as­
sault; more important to this Review, however, is that none would fall 
any faster, or more obviously, by another. Advocates of gay equality 
should avoid the thicket of ornate political theorizing and the poten­
tial boomerangs of postliberal legal theories. Instead, they should 
rivet the judicial gaze on the practical, human consequences of each 
antigay policy - what it really is, what it really does, whom it really 
hurts, and what it really costs. The analysis should proceed policy by 
policy, factual frame by factual frame. 
An illustration of this technique can be found in the most recent 
work of Janet Halley, which analyzes the military's "Don't Ask, Don't 
Tell" policy.40 Halley opens by noting the pervasive assumption that 
the 1993 policy is more lenient toward gay men and lesbians in uni­
form than the policy it replaced. She follows immediately with her 
underscored, unequivocal, and simple thesis: "The new military policy 
is much, much worse than its predecessor."41 The balance of the book 
is a penetrating, factually detailed, and thorough justification of this 
grim characterization of the 1993 amendments. 
Halley does several things that are of particular note here. She 
holds one object of critique - the military policy - constant through­
out. In doing so, she also exercises excruciating care to avoid either 
the absurd sundering of homosexual self-identification and same-sex 
erotic conduct that the status/conduct distinction entails, or the 
equally troublesome tendency to conflate them.42 She zeroes in on the 
ironic tautology embedded in the military policy - one that surfaces 
in so many attempts to regulate (or to even describe) homosexuality: 
"[W]hen the military predicts that self-described homosexuals will 
commit homosexual sodomy unacceptably often, it invokes a category 
of persons that has been developed precisely to make sense of its cate­
gory of acts."43 Indeed, the ironic, rhetorical renvoi that Halley identi­
fies may be inescapable. Not only the military policymaker, but also 
the serviceperson who says, "I am gay," implicitly may invoke that 
same "category of persons that has been developed precisely to make 
40. JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MlLITARY'S ANTI-GAY 
POLICY (1999). 
41. Id. at 1. 
42 See id. at 63. 
43. Id. at 65 (emphasis added). 
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sense of its category of acts." This is because all statements of gay sol­
dier identity must be understood against the backdrop of the military's 
(and other regulatory forces') problematic, labile, customarily nega­
tive, psycho-sociolegal assumptions about what "gay" is. Halley 
grasps the pervasive significance of this irony and takes particular care 
not to compound it. 
Halley's attack on the military antigay policy - a policy that now 
stands virtually alone in the Western world - is distinctive in two 
other respects. It systematically unpacks the military policy to strip 
away its veneer of sense, and it does so with minimal doctrinal or other 
theoretical props. Only at the very end does Halley suggest a specific 
legal plank for her attack - the rational basis test of constitutional 
law. But she quickly exits this doctrinal discussion and lets the fact­
based arguments do the persuasive work. She thereby elides the most 
constricting double binds of doctrine, while deploying conventional, 
quintessentially lawyerlike skill in exposing the infirm analytical struts 
of the military policy. 
She also pays scrupulous attention to language - not only the 
military's, but also her own. She eschews open-ended statements like 
"gay is good" or, for that matter, "heterosexuality is good." Rather, 
she avoids reinstating any "gay" category in to the legal lexicon. This 
is prudent, because deploying the term does not materially advance 
arguments for restricting the government's role in regulating sexual 
variations, and it may well boomerang. For "gay experience" to drop 
away as a punishable behavior, "gay experience" should not be in­
voked as a touchstone for any transformed jurisprudence. To charac­
terize any law as "gaylaw" is to risk - however unintentionally -
perpetuating a flat, reductive, and unnuanced understanding of sexual 
variations, which make it easier for lawmakers to justify attempts to 
categorize and punish these variations. 
Obviously, lawyers cannot escape doctrinal lines, categories, or re­
ductive terminologies altogether. But there is a more or less to this 
when it comes to legal advocacy. In contemporary constitutional 
challenges of antigay regulations - the primary focus of Eskridge's 
text - advocates should aim for less. That means minimal theorizing, 
in favor of maximal factfinding, and extensive documentation of the 
concrete, adverse, and unpredictable consequences of antigay meas­
ures. 
CONCLUSION 
Gaylaw correctly identifies a central problem - law has con­
structed "gay," engulfed "gay," and fostered a confusing, often harm­
ful, unexpected profusion of possible readings and misreadings of the 
people and behaviors it seeks to control. The way out of this snarl, 
however, is not to re-enmesh "gay" within "law." Rather, advocates 
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of gay equality should minimize theoretical adornments and avoid 
terminology that obscures the complexities and range of human sexual 
desires, identities, and conduct. Although the natural and under­
standable impulse is to counter historically negative legal, psychologi­
cal, and social treatment of gay experiences with a subversively posi­
tive, updated meaning of "gaylaw," this urge should be resisted; for 
the best way to free "gay" from law's constructing and constricting 
grasp is not to fuse them anew, but to pry these terms apart. 
Gaylaw offers excellent tools for effecting this separation. One 
need only mine its rich historical passages and deft doctrinal argu­
ments, pare away its theoretical excesses, and disaggregate its title. 
The considerable residue is an elegant and well-documented prag­
matic argument against most, if not all, of the remaining legal obsta­
cles to gay equality. The argument may hasten the day when the un­
becoming "gaylaw" chapter of American law is - at last - relegated 
to American history. 
